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Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
A B S T R A C T
There is much scholarly and policy interest in the role that international finance could play in closing the
financing gap for community adaptation initiatives. Despite the interest, the overall amount of international
adaptation finance that has reached local recipients remains low. What makes internationally-financed climate
change adaptation projects focus on investment at the community level is particularly poorly understood. This
study systematically assesses conditions that influence the focus on vulnerable local communities in inter-
nationally-financed adaptation projects. Using the Adaptation Fund (AF) under the Kyoto Protocol as the case
study, we apply fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to analyze 30 AF projects to identify specific
configurations of conditions that lead to a stronger or weaker community focus in project design. We find that
the absence of high exposure to projected future climate risks is a necessary condition for a weaker community
focus in AF projects. Three configurations of sufficient conditions are identified that lead to a stronger com-
munity focus. They involve the contextual factors of projected future climate risks, civil society governance, and
access modality to AF financing. In particular, AF projects with a stronger community focus are stimulated by the
sole presence of higher exposure to projected future climate risks in a group of countries, and by the com-
plementary roles of civil society governance and the access modality to the AF in others. These findings con-
tribute new insights on how to enhance local inclusiveness of global climate finance.
1. Introduction
Developing countries are vulnerable to the negative impacts of cli-
mate change (Füssel, 2010; IPCC, 2018, 2014). The poor, natural re-
source-dependent, and marginalized populations will bear a dis-
proportionate burden of adapting to these impacts (Mearns and
Norton, 2010; Olsson et al., 2014; Thomalla et al., 2006). Recognizing
this as global climate injustice and a barrier for achieving sustainable
development, the Paris Agreement calls for stronger international
commitments to support adaptation for the most vulnerable popula-
tions (UNFCCC, 2015a). Particularly vulnerable groups include women,
children, elderly, minorities, people with disabilities etc., who live in
vulnerable locations such as coastal zones, flood plains, rural areas, and
informal settlements in disaster-prone urban areas (Olsson et al., 2014;
Levy and Patz, 2015). Within this context, the paradigm that supports
local adaptation has also gained prominence (Nalau et al., 2015). For
example, community-based adaptation (CBA) has been increasingly
adopted to operationalize local adaptation (Fenton et al., 2014). The
CBA approach places the climate-vulnerable populations at the center
of adaptation decision-making and capitalizes on their local knowledge
for building adaptive capacity (Dodman and Mitlin 2013).
Kirkby et al. (2015) estimate that developing countries in Africa, Asia
and the Pacific Islands have implemented thousands of CBA projects in
recent years.
Despite the increased policy support, inadequate financing remains
a key barrier to community adaptation efforts in developing countries
(Schipper et al., 2014). There is much interest in the role that inter-
national adaptation finance could play to close the financing gap
(Fenton et al., 2014; UNEP, 2016). As a component of global climate
finance, international adaptation finance mostly originates from public
resources of developed countries and flows to developing countries to
fund adaptation actions (Buchner et al., 2015), as part of an interna-
tional commitment to address global climate injustice (Cameron et al.,
2013; Hall and Persson, 2017). Bilateral aid programs, multilateral
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development banks, and specialized multilateral climate funds are three
mechanisms that channel public international adaptation finance to-
wards developing-country recipients (OECD, 2018). But while public
international climate finance commitments have recenlty increased by
44% between 2013 and 2017 (OECD, 2018), Soanes et al. (2017) es-
timate that between 2003 and 2016 < 10% of climate finance was
flowing to local level i.e. entities below the district administration in-
cluding local governments, community-based organizations (CBOs),
local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), households and micro-
finance institutions.
Some international funding mechanisms have been more successful
in channeling resources towards local actions than others. The
Adaptation Fund (AF) under the Kyoto Protocol is recognized as a
successful example (Fenton et al., 2014). Fenton et al. (2014) argue that
the AF has performed well on integrating local-level adaptation in-
vestment in its portfolio because of: 1) its mandate which is centered on
vulnerable populations; 2) a requirement that project proposals prior-
itize particularly vulnerable communities; and 3) the option of direct
access that provides funding directly to national institutions. But while
these fund-related characteristics are important in shaping the AF's
portfolio, contextual conditions of recipient countries could also influ-
ence funding allocations at the project level (Rai et al., 2015;
Terpstra et al., 2013). For example, studies have showed that a coun-
try's administrative tradition (Biesbroek et al., 2018b) and level of de-
centralization (Brockhaus and Kambiré, 2009) could affect the policy
approach that a government takes to support climate change adaptation
across scales. As all proposed AF projects need to be endorsed by na-
tional governments of recipient countries, these country-level govern-
ance conditions are likely to be relevant in explaining whether the
government agencies take a strong community focus (or not) in these
projects. These contextual conditions could also interact with the AF's
fund-related characteristics to shape the project design. Understanding
such interaction requires a configurational research approach which
accounts for the interdependence among factors in shaping an outcome.
This paper assesses under which conditions multilateral climate
funds intensify or moderate the focus on local communities in their
adaptation investment at the project level. Using the AF as the case
study, the paper systematically compares 30 AF projects to analyze the
contextual conditions for a stronger or weaker community focus in the
design of each project. To systematically analyze the influence of
multiple contextual conditions, we use a Qualitative Comparative
Analysis (QCA) methodology. The methodology models the evidence in
a configurational way to determine the conditions and their combina-
tion that explain the occurrence of the outcome and its non-occurrence.
The ability to capture complex causal patterns enables us to better
understand and specify the contexts under which the varying degrees of
community focus in AF projects are shaped. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the first paper that uses the QCA methodology to study
international adaptation finance.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section develops a
theoretical framework in which we define what we mean by community
focus in AF projects and elaborate on the contextual conditions which
could theoretically influence the outcome. Section 3 describes the data
collection processes, discusses the QCA methodology, and presents the
operationalization of data for the fuzzy-set analysis. Section 4 presents
the main findings from the analysis of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for a stronger or weaker community focus in AF projects. The
paper then discusses the key findings and their implications and pro-
vides a conclusion.
2. Theoretical framework
2.1. Outcome: community focus in AF projects
Following Ayers and Forsyth (2009) and Reid et al. (2010), we
define vulnerable communities as groups of individuals and households
in villages, communes, neighborhoods, and settlements in climate-vul-
nerable locations. These communities are internally diverse but at the
same time share common characteristics, beliefs and/or actions that
shape their collective exposure to climate change (Agrawal, 2008).
While these local communities are highly vulnerable to climate change,
they are also believed to “have the skills, experience, local knowledge
and networks to undertake locally appropriate activities that increase
resilience and reduce vulnerability to a range of factors including cli-
mate change” (Dodman and Mitlin, 2013; pp. 640–641), and are
therefore a focus of adaptation interventions. As community actors such
as CBOs, community leaders, and community members can be dis-
tinguished from other local but more upwardly-located actors such as
cities, municipalities, and districts, we consider communities as the
most local level of beneficiaries of international adaptation finance.
Building on the literature on CBA (Forsyth, 2013; Kirkby et al.,
2017) and climate finance tracking at the local level (Fenton et al.,
2015; Soanes et al., 2017), we define three dimensions to assess the
level of community focus in AF projects: 1) the level of financial in-
vestment in community-level adaptation activities; 2) the level of com-
munity participation in project design and implementation; and 3) the
level of devolved decision-making to the community level.
2.1.1. Financial investment at the community level
Financial resources available to local communities are critical for
the implementation of adaptation actions. We therefore track the
amount of funding within each AF project that flows to activities which
generate direct adaptation benefits for community-level beneficiaries
(Fenton et al., 2015; Soanes et al., 2017). Examples of these activities
are the introduction of climate-resilient agricultural technologies to
farming communities, the construction of new village water harvesting
infrastructure, and capacity building for villagers and CBOs for com-
munity-based resource management. Excluded from these community-
level investments are AF project activities that build infrastructure
above the community scale, conduct technical analyses, improve the
capacity of government institutions and/or strengthen overall policy
and regulatory frameworks. An AF project that invests more in activ-
ities with direct adaptation benefits to local communities as a percen-
tage of the total project budget is considered as the first indicator of
being more community-focused.
2.1.2. Community participation
Community-focused adaptation requires active participation of
community stakeholders in project design and implementation
(Dodman and Mitlin, 2013; Forsyth, 2013; Lasage et al., 2015; Magee,
2013). The CBA literature emphasizes the importance of community
participation processes in the project design phase for synthesizing
scientific knowledge from external experts with local knowledge and
customs to identify locally-appropriate adaptation options (Ayers and
Forsyth, 2009; Piccolella, 2013; Reid et al., 2010), and for ensuring that
the selection of project beneficiaries is inclusive (Kirkby et al., 2015). It
also highlights the need for project financiers to use various cultural
and linguistic styles to create equitable participation space for different
sub-groups of community members (Roncoli et al., 2011). After project
activities have been initiated, continued community participation in
project implementation keeps the financier-beneficiary feedback loops
open, allowing for adaptive management, and meaningful evaluation of
lessons. We therefore consider an AF project with a higher level of
community participation during project design and implementation as
the second indicator of being more community-focused.
2.1.3. Devolved decision-making
Recent literature emphasizes that community-focused adaptation
also requires the devolution of decision-making power to the local level
(Regmi and Star, 2014). This is because community participation pro-
cesses alone do not guarantee that an externally-financed adaptation
project would be locally responsive. In many cases, community
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participation processes only engage community stakeholders as feed-
back providers to confirm a pre-determined project design
(UNDP, 2014), and are therefore of tokenistic value. For local com-
munities to truly determine the methods and goals of adaptation that
build on their knowledge, practices and preferences (Dodman and
Mitlin, 2013; Kirkby et al., 2015), there are calls for international cli-
mate funds to move beyond community consultation to devolve deci-
sion-making on fund use to the local level (Bosma et al., 2018). This
involves, for example, having local and downwardly-accountable actors
such as CBOs to formally serve as project executing entities (EEs) of
internationally-financed adaptation projects (AFB, 2008), and re-
locating funding approval functions, in addition to implementation and
execution authorities, to them (Müller, 2013). We therefore consider an
AF project which devolves more decision-making to community-level
actors as the third indicator of being more community-focused.
2.2. Conditions enabling community focus in internationally-financed
adaptation projects
Multilateral climate funds like the AF are channelling resources to
local project beneficiaries through national governments, international
organizations and civil society organizations. As local communities
cannot access the AF directly, they rely on these higher-level actors to
adopt inclusive adaptation planning, and to actively champion for
community adaptation needs to be prioritized for AF financing.
Understanding the contextual conditions that could influence these
higher-level actors’ willingness and capacity to do so is therefore re-
levant to understanding what makes AF-financed projects invest in
community-focused adaptation. Scholarly literature has identified three
groups of such relevant contextual conditions.
The first group relates to the level of climate change impacts on
developing countries, which could act as a catalyst for governments to
take actions to protect its vulnerable citizens (Ahmed et al., 2015;
Conevska et al., 2018). In this study, we use past climate-related losses
(condition 1) and projected future climate risks (condition 2) to re-
spectively represent the observed and projected climate vulnerability of
AF recipient countries.
The second group of conditions is related to the enabling govern-
ance environment for community-focused adaptation approaches. In
general, the level of government decentralization (Brockhaus and
Kambiré, 2009) and the role of civil society (Adhikari and Taylor, 2012;
Agrawal and Perrin, 2009; Chu et al., 2016) were found to be important
in previous studies, but they have not been sufficiently operationalized
for cross-country comparison. In this study, we use government struc-
ture (condition 3) and governance of civil society (condition 4) to re-
present the AF recipient countries’ enabling governance environment
for community-focused adaptation approaches.
Finally, the governance of international adaptation finance itself–-
particularly how finance is distributed from multilateral climate funds
to recipient countries through national or international implementing
entities–could also influence decision-making at the project level
(Scoville-Simonds, 2016; UNFCCC 2018). It its recent assessment of
global climate finance, the UNFCCC observes that “the operational
priorities, experience and networks of the implementing entities
through which climate finance is accessed can influence greatly how
funds are spent (UNFCCC, 2018, p.91).” As the last condition in this
QCA study, we therefore include the type of access modality which each
recipient country uses to access AF resources (condition 5) to represent
the governance of international adaptation finance.
The following sub-sections describe the theoretical expectations on
the role of each contextual condition in explaining the level of com-
munity focus in AF projects.
2.2.1. Condition 1: past climate-related losses
Past climate-related extreme events represent a country's level of
climate vulnerability, and are found to be a key predictor of national-
level adaptation actions (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014). Given that gov-
ernments have moral and legal obligations to protect citizens from
harms (Cameron et al., 2013), these extreme events could act as fo-
cusing events for governments to take protective actions (Jones and
Baumgartner, 2005). In reality, increasing losses from climate-related
extremes have indeed provided an impetus for governments to imple-
ment adaptation policy and actions (Ahmed et al., 2015; Berrang-
Ford et al., 2011; McEvoy et al., 2010). The impetus also drove de-
veloping-country governments with budget constraints to seek inter-
national adaptation finance. Reviewing 96 adaptation projects from
2004–2015 that targeted food systems, Conevska et al. (2018) find that
the impact of extreme weather events was the most cited motivation for
governments seeking financing from UNFCCC mechanisms for these
projects.
Given that the negative climate change impacts are experienced
primarily at the local level, there is evidence that, when governments
take adaptation actions, they increasingly pay attention to reducing the
vulnerability of local communities living in locations where negative
climate impacts have been experienced. For example, developing-
country governments have identified local communities such as rural
households and smallholder farmers in climate-vulnerable regions as
priority groups to benefit from adaptation policy actions (UNFCCC,
2015b). Among all UNFCCC member countries, 100 parties also con-
sider CBA as a major adaptation approach to be upscaled in their
countries (UNFCCC, 2015b). Such increasing prioritization of local
communities can also be observed in the use of international adaptation
finance at the project level (Conevska et al., 2018).
The above discussion suggests that there are precedents of past
extreme weather events acting as a catalyst for developing-country
governments to protect its citizens, including by seeking international
adaptation finance. At the same time, there is evidence that local
communities have received increasing attention from these govern-
ments as prioritized vulnerable groups, including by being targeted as
the primary beneficiaries of internationally-financed adaptation pro-
jects. Given these two precedents, we therefore hypothesize that gov-
ernments of countries which experienced higher climate-related losses
in the past would have an impetus to protect vulnerable local com-
munities from harms. When they apply for AF finance, they would also
have an incentive to influence the design of AF-financed adaptation
projects to have a stronger community focus.
2.2.2. Condition 2: projected future climate risks
Exposure to future climate risks is another key indicator of country
climate vulnerability (Füssel, 2010). Similar to Hinkel (2011), we un-
derstand country climate vulnerability here as a “measure of possible
future harm (p. 199).” Similar to experience with past climate risks,
exposure to future climate harms can also drive governments to take
anticipatory actions to protect citizens. These actions can be seen, for
example, when governments use projected future climate risks as a
basis to develop an adaptation policy framework (Government of
Indonesia, 2016; Ministry of Environment of Jordan, 2013). In re-
viewing global adaptation experience, Berrang-Ford et al. (2011) also
find that government actors particularly at the national level–though
more so in developed countries than developing countries–are more
likely to plan adaptation actions as response to long-term projected
climate change impacts, when compared to individuals and households
whose adaptation is largely stimulated by short-term factors such as
changing market conditions and extreme weather events.
Projected future climate risks have also informed climate vulnerability
assessments at regional and local levels, with results that enable govern-
ments to better plan anticipatory adaptation actions at these scales
(Barnett, 2011; Chen et al., 2015; Gustafson et al., 2017; Soora et al., 2013).
In recent years, climate projections in many developing countries have been
downscaled (Gustafson et al., 2017). These advances have given govern-
ments in these countries an expanded capacity to identify local climate
change hotspots, and to combine the science-based data with a community-
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based perspective on vulnerablity to better support community-level
adaptation processes (Gustafson et al., 2017).
The above discussion suggests that the presence of future climate
risks could motivate national governments to plan for anticipatory
adaptation, and that recent scientific advances have allowed these
governments in developing countries to do so more effectively at the
local level. Together with the precedent of local communities being an
adaptation priority of developing-country governments as discussed
above, these two observations have led us to expect that governments of
AF recipient countries with higher overall exposure from projected
climate risks would have an impetus to plan for anticipatory adapta-
tion, and when they do so using AF financing, they would have more
incentive in directing financing towards community-focused adapta-
tion.
2.2.3. Condition 3: government structure
As a key characteristic of government structure (Treisman, 2002),
decentralization generally refers to the transfer of power and re-
sources–political, fiscal or administrative–away from the central gov-
ernment to non-central government entities (Schneider, 2003). In rea-
lity, not all decentralization reforms involve the same degree of power
and resource transfer. Reforms that involve the relocation of decision-
making power are often characterized as political ‘devolution’
(Bardhan, 2002; Fisher, 1999), while those that involve only the re-
location of administrative functions are sometimes referred to as ‘de-
concentration’ (Agarwal et al., 2012; Regmi and Star, 2014;
Tacconi, 2007). Regardless of the degree, decentralization is one of the
most important reforms undertaken globally to promote good govern-
ance (Bardhan, 2002; Faguet, 2014). The most prominent argument for
decentralization is that “it will improve the accountability and re-
sponsiveness of government by altering its structure so as to increase
citizen voice and change the deep incentives that public officials face
(Faguet, 2014, p.2).” Decentralization is considered a promising me-
chanism to improve the governance environment needed for bottom-up
approaches to climate change adaptation (Brockhaus and Kambiré,
2009). As the disconnect between national governments and local
realities is often cited as a key governance barrier for these approaches
(Kuruppu and Willie, 2015), decentralization could address this dis-
connect by enhancing participatory governance by vulnerable local
communities, thus creating “ ‘short distances’ to local realities which
should result in adapted and highly responsive planning
(Brockhaus and Kambiré, 2009, p.411).” This could also lead to more
opportunities for mainstreaming adaptation in sub-national govern-
ment plans (D'Agostino and Sovacool, 2011). We therefore expect that
countries with more government decentralization, and by association
government closeness to local realities, are more likely to support AF
projects with a stronger community focus.
2.2.4. Condition 4: governance of civil society
Following Anheier et al. (2001), we define civil society as “the
sphere of institutions, organisations and individuals located between
the family, the state and the market, in which people associate vo-
luntarily to advance common interests (p.3)”, highlighting the nature of
civil society as “a space for collective action (Fioramonti and
Kononykhina, 2015, p.473).” While early literature largely assessed the
strength of civil society from its internal characteristics such as density,
membership, and legitimacy, recent studies have shifted attention to-
wards assessing civil society strength by analyzing its enabling en-
vironment (Fioramonti and Kononykhina, 2015; Simiti, 2017). In the
context of climate change, an enabled civil society is considered an
important agent of change in the process of adaptation (Adger, 2003),
by raising societal awareness about climate change from the bottom up,
serving as an intermediary mechanism to help align government po-
licies with community adaptation priorities (Lati, 2008), and directly
supporting CBA actions (Adhikari and Taylor, 2012; Webb et al., 2015).
In the context of climate finance, civil society is a key implementation
partner of multilateral climate funds including the AF (Adaptation Fund
NGO Network, 2012). As a check-and-balance mechanism, civil society
is also expected to play a pivotal role in ensuring that the use of climate
finance is reaching the poor and most vulnerable communities
(Ballesteros et al., 2010; Colenbrander et al., 2018; Peterson Carvalho
and Terpstra, 2015). We therefore expect to see a stronger community
focus in AF projects in recipient countries with a more conducive
governance environment for civil society to operate.
2.2.5. Condition 5: governance of international adaptation finance (access
modality)
Access modality broadly refers to “the institutional architecture
through which funding decisions are made and finance flows
(Bird, 2014, p.6).” As such, it constitutes a key governance context
shaping the fund-recipient relationships. Two access modalities allow
developing-country recipients to access financing from the AF: under
the indirect access modality, the recipients access funding through in-
ternational intermediary organizations accredited by the fund as its
multilateral implementing entities (MIEs) or regional implementing
entities (RIEs); under the direct access modality, national organizations
are accredited as national implementing entities (NIEs) to manage the
funding and project implementation. Indirect access has been and re-
mains the most dominant access modality to international adaptation
finance today (Duus-Otterström, 2016). It allows developing countries
with limited institutional capacities, adaptation expertise, and climate
finance experience to tap into those of international organizations.
Direct access modalities are considered an innovation in climate finance
governance pioneered by the AF to enable recipient countries to
manage their own funds and projects, strengthen country ownership
and build national institutional capacities in climate finance
(Adaptation Fund, 2012; Brown et al., 2010). The role of direct access
in ensuring that climate finance is locally accountable has received
strong attention (Bosma et al., 2018). It is argued that direct access
would shorten the distances between local actors and the NIE-led pro-
ject design process, thus allowing local priorities to be better captured
(Fenton et al., 2014), enhance project ownership among government
officials who are more accountable to local populations (Bosma et al.,
2018; Craeynest et al., 2010; Müller and Pizer, 2014), and increase
opportunities for devolution of funding decision-making to local actors
such as civil society and local communities themselves (Bosma et al.,
2018). Based on these arguments, we expect to see a stronger com-
munity focus in direct-access AF projects compared to indirect-access
projects.
While each of the conditions above could theoretically influence the
level of community focus in AF projects independently, it is also pos-
sible that they affect the outcome by acting in conjunction. For ex-
ample, the impact of direct access in enhancing community-focused
adaptation could be magnified in recipient countries which are already
decentralized. The configurational approach employed in this study
allows us to investigate whether such interaction between country de-
centralization and direct access exists in shaping the community-fo-
cused outcome.
3. Method
3.1. Sampling of cases
We choose the AF as the case study for three main reasons. First,
while the AF is prioritizing most vulnerable local communities, the AF
does not have a dedicated community-financing program like other
funds, for example, the CBA pilot program of the Global Environment
Facility Small Grant programs (Huq and Faulkner, 2013). We could
therefore expect to see the different degrees of emphasis on community-
based approaches at the project level as a result of context-specific
negotiation among stakeholders. This ensures sufficient variation in the
outcome for our QCA study. Second, compared to the Green Climate
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Fund which has also introduced direct access more recently, the AF has
financed a higher number of direct-access versus indirect-access adap-
tation projects, thus offering more cases for comparative analysis.
Third, all AF projects have approved project proposal documents which
are publicly available in English on its website. Each document pro-
vides detailed information about project design which enables a sys-
tematic review and comparison.
To identify the sample for this study, we first identify all projects
approved by the AF as of May 2017, resulting in 63 projects from 53
countries. We then compare the available country data for the first four
theorized conditions (See Section 2.2) for the 53 countries. Based on
data availability, we reduce the sample size to 30 project countries,
with a total of 38 approved projects. To avoid country bias in our
sample size, we randomly select one project from each of the four
countries with more than one project (India, Argentina, Peru, and South
Africa). This results in the final sample of 30 projects from 30 countries
for our QCA study (See Table A1 in Appendix A for the list of countries
and Supplementary Material 1 for more project details).
3.2. Fuzzy-set analysis and configurational logic
This study employs a fuzzy-set analysis, which is one technique
within the broader QCA methodology (Ragin, 2000). The application of
fuzzy-set QCA to social sciences is argued to be particularly suitable for
studying complex phenomena, as it detaches from the traditional dis-
tinction between case-oriented and variable-oriented research
(Cebotari and Vink, 2013). Specifically, fuzzy-set analysis assumes
conjunctural causation and aims at assessing whether conditions, in-
dependently or together in a configuration, explain the presence or
absence of the outcome. As a systematic comparative method, fuzzy-set
analysis is suitable for small and medium N-samples and combines
quantitative information with a case-oriented approach, where good
knowledge of each case is needed to explain the link between theory,
the cases, and obtained findings (Kirchherr et al., 2016; Pahl-Wostl and
Knieper, 2014).
Fuzzy-set technique revolves around the analysis of subset relations
and distinguishes between the necessary and sufficient conditions and
their configurational logic (Ragin, 2009, 2000). Fuzzy-set analysis
employs several steps. First, the empirical and theoretical evidence
feeds in a raw dataset that includes the outcome and conditions for each
case. Second, raw values for conditions and the outcome are calibrated
into fuzzy-set partial membership scores using evidence-based thresh-
olds. The calibration leads to fuzzy-set membership scores for the out-
come and conditions, which are based on values in the interval between
[0] (non-membership) and [1] (full membership). Third, the fuzzy-set
scores are used in the analyses of necessary and sufficient conditions
leading to the presence and absence of the outcome. Based on the logic
of subset relations, the status of being a necessary condition implies that
the outcome (Yi) is a subset of the condition (Xi), where the fuzzy-set
scores of the outcome should be lower or equal to the fuzzy-set scores of
the condition (Yi ≤ Xi). Inversely, the status of being a sufficient
condition implies that the condition is a subset of the outcome, where
the fuzzy-set scores of the condition are lower or equal to the fuzzy-set
scores of the outcome (Xi ≤ Yi). Specifics related to the outcome,
conditions, calibrations, and the analyses of necessary and sufficient
conditions, are subsequently presented in greater detail.
3.3. Operationalization and calibration of measurements
3.3.1. Outcome
The outcome of this study is the community focus in AF projects.
Data for the outcome are collected from 30 AF project documents across
three dimensions: financial investment in community-level activities,
community participation, and devolved decision-making. We develop a
codebook to guide our extraction of data for the three dimensions using
AtlasTi. (see Supplementary Material 2).
For the financial dimension, we apply the granular approach of the
climate-finance tracking methodology jointly developed by multilateral
development banks (IADB et al., 2017). Specifically, we identify within
each project components and sub-components that invest in commu-
nity-level activities and track the financing attached to them. Once we
extract this from each project document, we calculate the community-
level budget as a percentage of total project budget for the 30 projects.
We exclude from this calculation project administration fees charged by
AF implementing entities to identify the true fraction of financing that
reaches community adaptation activities. We then convert the percen-
tages into three categories of scores by looking at the distribution of the
percentages of community-based project budget in the 30 projects: the
top one-third of projects with highest percentages are classified as
having ‘high’ financial investment at the community level, the middle
third as ‘medium’ level and the bottom third as ‘low’ level. We then
assign the score of 3 to ‘high’ projects, 2 to ‘medium’ projects, and 1 to
‘low’ projects, respectively.
We assess the level of community participation using four in-
dicators: 1) the type of public participation during project consultation
(ascendingly ranked as consultation, partnership, and community self-
mobilization); 2) the number of roles played by community actors
throughout the project cycle; 3) the number of dimensions of climate
vulnerability addressed by the project (e.g. livelihood sources, gender,
health status, geography etc.); and 4) the number of beneficiary sub-
categories (e.g. the elderly, children, women, ethnic minorities etc.).
The level of devolved decision-making in AF projects is assessed using
three sub-indicators: 1) the type of organizations that the NIEs or MIEs/
RIEs contract to serve as project executing entities (EEs), using the ty-
pology of international, national, sub-national, and local organizations;
2) the type of organizations that EEs partner with, using the same or-
ganizational typology; and 3) the use of mechanisms for local decision-
making on project approvals and adaptation choices (such as a small
grant facility and calls for proposals from communities). We add the
scores of the four community participation sub-indicators to calculate
an overall community participation score for each of the 30 projects,
and do the same for the overall devolved decision-making score. We
then use the same distributional approach as for the financial dimen-
sion to rank the 30 projects into ‘high’, ‘medium’ and ‘low’ categories
and assign the scores of 3, 2, and 1, respectively. (See more explanation
of the indicators in Supplementary Material 2).
Finally, we add the financial, participation, and devolved decision-
making scores to calculate an overall ‘community focus’ outcome score
for each of the 30 project cases. A project with a ‘community focus’
outcome score of 9 indicates that it is characterized by high financial
investment at the community level (score = 3), high community par-
ticipation (score = 3) and high devolved decision-making to commu-
nity-level actors (score = 3). On the other hand, a project with an
outcome score of 3 indicates that the project scores low in all the three
categories (i.e. score =1 + 1 + 1). Projects with outcome scores be-
tween 4 and 8 indicate that they have different mixtures of low,
medium, high scores from three dimensions of community focus. (See
Table A1 in Appendix A for the 30 outcome scores).
3.3.2. Conditions
For the Condition 1 on ‘past climate-related losses’, we use the 20-
year average rankings from the Global Climate Risk Index (CRI), a
comprehensive and frequently used database to proxy countries’ his-
torical climate exposure in cross-country studies (Berrang-Ford et al.,
2014; Betzold and Weiler, 2018; Tranter and Booth, 2015). For ex-
ample, if an AF project in India was approved in 2012, we use the
1992–2011 average CRI ranking for India as a proxy for past climate-
related losses affecting the decisions of agencies involved in designing
such project. This choice of data ensures that we only capture losses
materializing before the date of project approval. An average ranking
also better reflects a country's overall exposure to climate extremes than
one year of data, and better captures the cases whereby AF project
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decisions are influenced by a cumulative experience of past extreme
events.
Data for the Condition 2 on ‘projected future climate risks’ come from
the exposure sub-index of the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
(ND-GAIN) Country Index, which measures the degree by which a
country is biophysically exposed to future climate hazards (Chen et al.,
2015). Betzold and Weiler (2018) used the ND-GAIN exposure sub-
index and the CRI side-by-side to respectively measure the impacts of
past and future climate vulnerability in recipient countries on bilateral
donors’ allocation of adaptation finance between these countries. They
found both indicators to be statistically significant, with the ND-GAIN
exposure sub-index scores correlated with both the selection of re-
cipient countries and the allocated amounts, while the CRI only cor-
related with recipient selection.
For the Condition 3 on ‘government structure’, we use country scores
from the Government Closeness Index (GCI). Using data for mid 2000s
(mostly 2005), the GCI is a global database of indicators that do not
only measure how decentralized a country's government is, but also
how close a decentralized government is to its citizens (Ivanyna and
Shah, 2014). While other global databases, such as the tiers of gov-
ernment (Treisman, 2008) and the Varieties of Democracy dataset (V-
Dem Institute, 2018), contain decentralization-related indicators for
developing countries, the GCI was specifically designed to capture most
closely the discussed concept of ‘short distances’ between national
governments and local populations. We therefore consider the GCI most
fit-for-purpose.
For the Condition 4 on ‘governance of civil society’, we use the
Governance Environment Sub-index under the CIVICUS Civil Society
Enabling Environment Index launched in 2013. Conceptualizing civil
society as a space for collective action, the sub-index focuses on gov-
ernance indicators most theoretically relevant to rights and freedoms
which enable civic participation (Fioramonti and Kononykhina, 2015).
For the Condition 5 on ‘access modality’, we use Atlas.ti to extract
information on the condition from the AF project documents. Projects
with MIEs and RIEs are coded as indirect access, and projects with NIEs
as direct access. Direct access is assigned the value of 1 and indirect
access of 0. (See Table A2 in Appendix A for more information on all the
data sources for the five conditions).
3.3.3. Fuzzy-set data calibration
For each case, we calibrate fuzzy-set scores on the outcome and the
five conditions, thus transforming ‘raw’ data into fuzzy-set membership
scores. The fsQCA software calibration tool is used for this procedure
(Ragin and Davey, 2016). The calibration tool uses well-informed
threshold values to automatically assign fuzzy-set scores to each mea-
surement. The outcome and four conditions have each three threshold
values: the full membership in the set (fuzzy-set score = 1), the non-
membership in the set (fuzzy-set score = 0), and a crossover point
above which a case is closer to full membership and below which a case
is closer to non-membership. One condition, the access modality, is
binary and we do not calibrate it as the data are already in a 0,1 format.
Table 1 summarizes the thresholds used to calibrate the raw data into
fuzzy-set scores. For the detailed distribution of raw and fuzzy-set
scores of the 30 project cases, see Appendix A, Table A1. Furthermore,
the rationale for choosing these specific calibration thresholds are de-
tailed in Appendix A, Table A2.
3.4. Research limitations
Some limitations should be noted given the nature of the study.
First, assessing the level of community-focused adaptation is challen-
ging as the concept of community is contested (Kepe, 1999; Titz et al.,
2018), and what constitutes community focus is subject to interpreta-
tions. While the rich CBA literature significantly shapes the current
understanding of key characteristics of community adaptation in-
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‘community focus’ across projects and countries. Recognizing this
complexity, we integrate both quantitative and qualitative perspectives
to develop a more informed, and arguably reasonably nuanced, picture
of each adaptation project's level of community focus. However, future
studies could consider adding more aspects of assessment for a more
comprehensive understanding of community-focused adaptation.
Second, the ‘community focus’ outcome score in this paper re-
presents an overview of each project's community orientation at the
design completion stage but not in its actual implementation. As these
projects mature, future studies should assess if they also exhibit post-
implementation characteristics of meaningful community-level adap-
tation such as accountability, transparency, sustainability, flexibility,
ownership, capacity building, participatory monitoring and evaluation
etc. (Faulkner et al., 2015; Fenton et al., 2015; Terpstra et al., 2013).
Third, limited diversity complicates the analysis of community-fo-
cused adaptation in this study. Limited diversity refers to when logi-
cally possible combinations of conditions are not covered by empirical
evidence (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p.328). In this study, 15 of
32 different configurations of conditions are not assigned empirical
cases, which impedes a full-fledged conclusion based on observations.
Future research could aim to test the observed configurational evidence
from this study with more cases.
Finally, the study is designed to focus on the country-level enabling
conditions for internationally financed, community-focused adaptation
projects. As a result, it does not capture the importance of regional and
local contexts which could also shape the outcome. However, there are
severe data limitations to assess regional and local conditions across
developing countries. Future research could explore relevant regional
and local conditions and potential data sources for them, as well as
identify more project cases to provide additional insights on the scale
and configurational logic tested in this study. Adding multiple projects
for each country would also bring the opportunity to better assess the
within-country variations of different community-focused projects.
4. Results
This section presents the analyses of necessary and sufficient conditions
for the presence of the outcome (a stronger community focus in AF projects)
and the absence of the outcome (a weaker community focus in AF projects).
It must be noted that both analyses employ two parameters of fit. The first
parameter is called ‘consistency’ and indicates the degree to which the
subset relation is approximated. Values of consistency can range between 0
and 1, with higher values indicating a better subset relation. There are no
clearly defined standards to set the benchmark for consistent subset rela-
tions (Schneider and Wagemann, 2010), but a consistency value of 0.80 is
generally seen as the minimum accepted cut-off point for a reliable set
analysis for sufficiency (Ragin, 2009). A consistency threshold of 0.9 is
advised for necessity (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p.143).
The second parameter of fit is ‘coverage’ and indicates the relation in
size of the overlap between the condition set and the outcome set. In the
analysis of necessary conditions, the coverage shows the relevance and
trivialness of a necessary condition (Schneider and Wagemann, 2012). Si-
milarly, in the analysis of sufficient conditions, the coverage shows how
much of the outcome is covered by the sufficient condition at hand
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p.325).
For simplicity, all measurements have been assigned a one-word
coding, which is specified when results for the necessary and sufficient
conditions are presented. The wording of each condition and the out-
comes is outlined in Table 2.
4.1. Necessary conditions
The analysis of necessary conditions includes the presence and ab-
sence of all conditions for both the presence and absence of the out-
come. Table 2 presents the findings of the necessity analysis. We find no
necessary condition for the presence of the outcome. However, with a
consistency score of 0.91, we find that the absence of high exposure to
future climate risks is a necessary condition for the absence of the out-
come. Although the consistency score of 0.91 is relatively high, it is
slightly below the perfect consistency score of 1.00, so we approach this
condition as ‘quasi-necessary’. With a moderate coverage score of 0.52,
we conclude that the absence of high exposure to future climate risks is a
nontrivial necessary condition for a weaker community focus in AF
projects. However, it does not explain the full variation in the weakness
of community focus exhibited by the projects.
Nevertheless, our analysis suggests that, without a high degree of
vulnerability to future climate harms, countries would not have acted to
direct more AF project financing towards local communities. However,
given that there is no necessary condition for the presence of the out-
come, the opposite is not the case; a higher degree of vulnerability to
future climate harms does not guarantee the presence of a stronger
community focus in AF projects. This can be interpreted as when
countries are highly exposed to future climate risks, whether or not they
would design AF projects to have a stronger community focus is not
explained by one necessary condition, but a configuration of sufficient
conditions.
4.2. Sufficient conditions for stronger community focus in AF projects
The analysis of sufficiency is performed by outlining the logical
combinations of all conditions and linking them to the presence or the
absence of the outcome. The analysis produces three types of solution
terms: conservative, parsimonious, and intermediate. Here, we follow
the recommendation of Baumgartner and Thiem (2017) (p.24) and
present the parsimonious solution, as it represents the superset of the
intermediate and complex solutions and was found to better reflect
analyses exposed to limited empirical diversity. Table 3 presents the
results of the analysis of sufficient conditions of this study. The con-
servative solution, which does not use simplifying assumptions in lo-
gical minimization, and intermediate solution, whose logical mini-
mization is informed by directional expectations from theories, are also
presented in the Appendix B. The truth tables showing all logical
combinations for the analysis of sufficient conditions are included in the
Appendix C .
We find that the parsimonious solution contains three paths of
configurations of sufficient conditions enabling AF projects with a
stronger community focus (Table 3). The consistency score of the
overall solution formula (encompassing the entire solution) is 0.805,
meaning that the claim that these configurations are sufficient for the
outcome to occur is supported by empirical evidence. The coverage
score of 0.690 indicates that the solution formula explains roughly 69%
of the outcome when it is present. Overall, cases may have membership
in more than one configuration, as is the case of projects in Mali, Kenya,
Rwanda, and Ethiopia because the memberships in configuration of sets
may overlap.
We present the solutions in a configuration format, using the coding
of conditions as presented in Table 2. Terms in capital letters mean the
presence of the condition, while lower-case terms mean the absence of
the condition. Furthermore, the sign “ * ” indicates the logical relation
“AND” between the conditions. Configuration 1 contains a single con-
dition which by itself is sufficient to explain the presence of the out-
come. Configurations 2 and 3 contain the so-called INUS conditions,
that is conditions which are themselves insufficient but form a neces-
sary part of an unnecessary but sufficient configuration (Schneider and
Wagemann, 2012). In other words, INUS conditions can be understood
as relevant elements in the observed configuration in which the out-
come is shaped (Cebotari and Vink, 2013).
Configuration 1: CLIMFUTURE
Configuration 1 shows that the presence of higher exposure to fu-
ture climate risks is individually sufficient to explain the presence of a
stronger community focus in AF projects in eight cases. The cases are
from Niger, India, Mali, Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, and Sri
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Lanka. In these countries, AF projects are designed to have a stronger
community focus regardless of the level of past climate-related losses,
the decentralization characteristic of government structure, the gov-
ernance of civil society, and the access modality to the AF.
Configuration 2: GOVCIVIL * modality
Configuration 2 shows that indirect-access AF projects are designed
to have a stronger community focus in countries with a more conducive
governance environment for civil society. The presence of conducive
civil society governance and the indirect access modality work together
as INUS conditions for the outcome to occur, regardless of the level of
exposure to past and future climate risks and the prevailing level of
government decentralization. This configuration applies to six cases,
namely Belize, Ghana, Guatemala, Mali, Paraguay and Lebanon.
Configuration 3: govcivil * MODALITY
Configuration 3 is the flip side of the Configuration 2 and applies to
five cases: Ethiopia, Jordan, Morocco, Rwanda, and Kenya. Despite the
absence of conducive civil society governance, direct-access AF projects
are designed to have a stronger community focus. Here, the weak civil
society governance and the direct access modality appear together as
INUS conditions that explain the outcome of a stronger community
focus in AF projects, independently of the roles of past and future cli-
mate risks and the level of government decentralization.
4.3. Sufficient conditions for weaker community focus in AF projects
The analysis of sufficient conditions for the absence of the outcome
uses the same five conditions employed in the previous analysis. The
fuzzy-set analysis indicates that there are two paths in the parsimonious
solution that are sufficient to explain a weaker community focus in AF
projects (Table 3). The overall solution consistency is high (0.84),
suggesting that its claim is empirically supported. At the same time, the
overall coverage score of 0.38 means that the solution formula explains
roughly 38% of the outcome of a weaker community focus in AF pro-
jects. This suggests that a large part of the negated outcome remains
unexplained by the conditions in Configurations 4 and 5. Further re-
search may unveil additional conditions relevant to explaining a weaker
community focus in AF projects.
Configuration 4: govcivil * GOVSTRUCTURE * CLIMPAST
Configuration 4 shows that AF projects with a weaker community
focus can be found in the context of recipient countries with weak civil
society governance, despite these countries having decentralized gov-
ernments and having experienced high losses from past climate-related
extremes. This situation applies to projects in Honduras and Colombia
and occurs regardless of the countries’ exposure to projected future
climate risks and the access modality to the AF.
Table 2
Analysis of necessary conditions for stronger and weaker community-focus in AF projects.
Condition Code Stronger community-focus in AF projects
(Presence of the outcome)
Weaker community-focus in AF projects
(Absence of the outcome)
Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage
Past climate-related losses CLIMPAST 0.39 0.71 0.46 0.58
climpast 0.77 0.67 0.77 0.47
Projected future climate risks CLIMFUTURE 0.42 0.87 0.29 0.42
climfuture 0.72 0.59 0.91* 0.52
Government structure GOVSTRUCTURE 0.69 0.60 0.73 0.44
govstructure 0.36 0.65 0.35 0.44
Governance of civil society GOVCIVIL 0.59 0.69 0.61 0.50
govcivil 0.57 0.68 0.61 0.51
Access modality MODALITY 0.47 0.64 0.38 0.36
modality 0.53 0.55 0.62 0.45
Notes: Uppercase letters refer to the presence of a condition, and lowercase letters to the absence of a condition.
⁎ consistency score ≥ 0.90.
Table 3
Fuzzy-set analysis of sufficient conditions for stronger and weaker community-focus in AF projects (parsimonious solutions).
Stronger community-focus in AF projects Weaker community-focus in AF projects















Access modality MODALITY X
modality X X
Cases Niger, India, Mali, Uganda,









Consistency 0.872 0.788 0.861 0.869 0.809
Raw coverage 0.421 0.318 0.238 0.254 0.145
Unique coverage 0.134 0.172 0.097 0.233 0.123
Solution consistency 0.805 0.844
Solution coverage 0.690 0.378
Notes: Uppercase letters refer to the presence of a condition, and lowercase letters refer to the absence of a condition.
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Configuration 5: govstructure * climfuture * climpast * modality
Configuration 5 shows that a configuration of four con-
ditions–centralized government, low exposure to future climate risks,
low past climate-related losses and the use of indirect access modality
to access AF funding–explains a weaker community focus in AF projects
in Egypt and Mauritania, regardless of the governance environment of
civil society.
5. Discussion
We briefly discuss the QCA results, focusing on each of the five
conditions and how they relate to community focus in AF projects as the
outcome, before discussing the contributions of our work to the debates
on international adaptation finance.
When comparing the two conditions representing recipient-country
climate vulnerability (Conditions 1 and 2), we find that the exposure to
future harms has a stronger explanatory value, as its absence is found to
be a necessary condition for a weaker community focus in AF projects,
while its presence is also sufficient by itself to explain a stronger
community focus in AF projects in eight countries (Niger, India, Mali,
Uganda, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kenya, and Sri Lanka). On the other hand,
the accumulated experience from past climate-related losses does not
help explain any case of stronger community focus in AF projects, while
its absence only forms part of the observed explanation for a weaker
community focus in two AF projects, but for which the projected future
climate risks condition also plays a contributing role.
We interpret these findings to support the theoretical expectation that
national governments, especially when using international adaptation fi-
nance to protect local communities, have more incentives to plan for
adaptation as anticipatory actions than as reaction to past climate extremes,
which differs from the finding of Conevska et al. (2018). Our finding also
expands Berrang-Ford et al. (2011) by providing new evidence that devel-
oping-country governments are also anticipatory adaptation actors, and
offers counter-evidence to studies that found scientific uncertainties and
long timeframes associated with climate projections to be a key barrier for
anticipatory adaptation actions (Barnett, 2001; Ford et al., 2015). Three
factors could offer explanations for our findings. First, both improved
weather monitoring and downscaled climate projections have enabled cli-
mate vulnerability assessment at sub-national scales, thus allowing AF
projects to identify climate hotspots and better target vulnerable groups in
these regions. This is evident in the AF project in Sri Lanka, whereby dis-
trict-level climate vulnerability analyses were used to design adaptation
interventions to address increased rainfall variability in the Mahaweli Basin.
Second, local communities increasingly perceive changing current climate
hazards to be associated with future climate change, thus creating a sense of
urgency for actions despite future climate uncertainties. This is evident in
the AF project in India, whereby perceptions expressed by hill communities
in Uttarakhand during stakeholder consultation have formed the basis for
project activities. Third, there has been an increased adoption of the vul-
nerability-centric framing of adaptation (Dupuis and Biesbroek, 2013;
Hall, 2017), which considers existing development deficits as drivers of
social vulnerabilities to future climate change and highlights the need to
address these drivers today as anticipatory adaptation. The influence of this
framing is present in all eight AF project countries for which the high ex-
posure to future climate risks is a sufficient condition for a stronger com-
munity focus.
We do not find the decentralization characteristic of government
structure (Condition 3) to be an important condition for community
focus in AF projects. While forming part of the sufficient conditions for
four cases of AF projects with a weaker community focus, government
structure was not part of any configuration of conditions that explains
the 19 cases of AF projects with a stronger community focus. On the
other hand, the AF projects in Honduras and Columbia exhibit a lower
community focus despite the presence of more localized governments,
which contradicts the theoretical expectation for the government struc-
ture condition. This high decentralization-low community focus
anomaly could be potentially explained by the presence of barriers that
prevent the decentralization promise for bottom-up adaptation from
being realized. These barriers include limited connection and in-
formation flows between national and local government actors, unclear
division of responsibilities in adaptation planning and financing
(Brockhaus and Kambiré, 2009), limited technical capacities among
local government agencies (Madzwamuse, 2011), limited integration of
civil society in the decentralized processes (Brockhaus and Kambiré,
2009), and potential capture of decentralized decision-making by local
elites (Bardhan, 2002; Persha and Andersson, 2014).
We find that the conducive governance environment of civil society
(condition 4) is an important contextual condition for community focus
in AF projects. This is evidenced by the presence of this condition in
Configuration 2 and its absence in Configuration 3, which together
explain a stronger community focus in 11 project cases, and also by its
absence in Configuration 4 that explains a weaker community focus in
two project cases. In Belize, Ghana, Guatemala, Mali, and Paraguay, our
finding indicates that conducive civil society governance plays a key
role in shaping indirect-access AF projects to have a stronger commu-
nity focus. Arguably, the conducive governance environment has al-
lowed civil society organizations in these countries to effectively com-
municate the expectations of targeted project communities to MIEs/
RIEs during consultation processes, thus closing the knowledge gap on
local realities which could have otherwise inhibited community-fo-
cused project design. However, despite the presence of both decen-
tralized governments and high exposure to past climate-related losses,
the presence of unconducive civil society governance still contributes to
a lower community focus in AF projects in Honduras and Colombia.
This is potentially because civil society organizations operating in this
environment are unlikely to effectively mobilize and represent vulner-
able local communities in AF project consultation processes. These
findings support the theoretical expectation for the GOVCIVIL/govcivil
condition (condition 3). However, we also find cases of a stronger
community focus in AF projects in Ethiopia, Jordan, Morocco, Rwanda,
and Kenya, despite the presence of weaker civil society governance.
Since all of these cases are direct-access projects, the finding suggests
that the role of the direct access modality should be investigated closely
to understand the presence of a stronger community focus in these
cases.
It should be noted that Lebanon is a deviant case in our analysis
above due to the ambiguous membership (0.52) in Configuration 2 and
also a very low membership score in the outcome (0.05). In this am-
biguous case, the indirect- access project in Lebanon exhibits a low
community focus (0.05), despite the country having a conductive
governance environment for civil society (0.52). However, the bor-
derline membership of 0.52 barely fulfills the status of having a con-
ductive governance environment in Lebanon, and the influence of this
condition appears to be outweighed by a weaker community focus in
the project design. This contradicts the pattern seen in other cases
under Configuration 2. This therefore suggests that it will be con-
troversial to consider Lebanon as a typical case for either weak or
strong community focus in subsequent process tracing analysis of causal
mechanisms linked to configurations outlined in this study.
Finally, our finding confirms that the access modality (condition 5)
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is another important contextual condition. We draw this conclusion
because the condition helps explain the presence of a stronger com-
munity focus in 11 project cases and the absence of such outcome in
two project cases. However, our result also suggests that the
MODALTY/modality condition on its own is not sufficient for the pre-
sence or absence of the outcome, but it works configurationally with
other conditions. For the presence of the outcome, the access modality
condition works in conjunction the governance environment for civil
society condition. On the one hand, the “GOVCIVIL * modality” config-
uration indicates that an enabled civil society could help compensate
for the long distances between local communities and MIEs/RIEs,
leading to indirect-access AF projects with a stronger community focus.
On the other hand, the “govcivil * MODALITY” configuration suggests
that the direct access modality helps shorten the vertical distances be-
tween AF project consultation processes and local civil society organi-
zations in recipient countries, despite them being otherwise constrained
by the overall weak civil society governance environment. In this sense,
our finding lends support to the theoretical expectation that the direct
access modality could “in certain national contexts, lead to greater civil
society participation in the AF project cycle (Ballesteros et al., 2010,
p.28).” For the absence of the outcome, the indirect access modality
works in conjunction with the low levels of past climate-related losses
(condition 1) and projected future climate risks (condition 2) and the
presence of a centralized government structure to explain a weaker
community focus in AF in two recipient countries. These findings also
support the theoretical expectations discussed in Section 2.2.
Overall, our findings contribute to the adaptation literature in three
ways. First, by looking at projects financed by the AF, we place these
planned community adaptation initiatives in the context of global cli-
mate governance, in which mobilizing and transferring finance is an
important mode of such governance (Hall and Persson, 2017). This
differs from, but complements, much of the existing literature that
discusses these initiatives as local actions shaped largely by within-
community characteristics including risk perceptions, local knowledge
systems and capacity of local institutions (Alam et al., 2017;
Lebel, 2013; Sekine et al., 2009).
Second, we add new insights to the growing body of literature that
discusses the limits of stand-alone community adaptation actions and em-
phasizes the importance of macro-level enabling factors (Adhikari and
Taylor, 2012; Archer et al., 2014; McNamara and Buggy, 2017;
Mimura et al., 2014; Regmi and Star, 2015; Spires et al., 2014). Our find-
ings bring attention to the role of vulnerability to future climate risks, the
governance of civil society and the access modality to international climate
funds as three important enabling conditions for internationally-financed,
community-focused adaptation.
Third, while adaptation research has until recently been dominated
by in-depth, qualitative, single or small-N studies (Biesbroek et al.,
2018a), this study develops a new and integrated model of assessing
community focus in AF projects from the set-theoretic lenses of neces-
sary and sufficient conditions. The methodological innovation of this
study is twofold: (a) the fuzzy-set analysis of the community focus in AF
projects employs a configurational logic, in which several conditions
interrelate and often need to be understood in a conjunctural manner;
and (b) to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to point to a
causal asymmetry in the study of community focus in adaptation pro-
jects, in that what explains the weaker outcome is not automatically the
negation of the conditions, or configuration of conditions, that explains
the stronger outcome. The causal asymmetry is often overlooked by
studies, as it cannot be captured easily with mainstream data modelling
techniques.
This study also makes two contributions to the climate finance litera-
ture. First, while previous studies highlighted the potential of the direct
access modality in supporting community-level adaptation (Fenton et al.,
2014), our findings demonstrate that indirect-access adaptation projects
could equally focus on local vulnerable communities when working in
conjunction with an enabled civil society. In addition, the outcome assess-
ment framework developed for this paper (see Section 2.1) could form a
basis for developing an operational methodology to track the delivery of
global adaptation finance to the community level. The existing standardized
tracking methodologies, such as the Rio-Markers used by bilateral donors
(OECD, 2016) and the joint climate-finance tracking approach used by
multilateral banks (IADB et al., 2017), are not designed to mark commu-
nity-bounded financing. As a result, there is a major global knowledge gap
on the actual amount of global adaptation finance allocations that have
reached community-level beneficiaries. A new community-focused metho-
dology is needed to close the gap and ensure tracking consistency as part of
a transparency mechanism under the Paris Agreement (Lesnikowski et al.,
2017).
6. Conclusion
Using the AF as the case study, this study assesses under which
conditions internationally-financed adaptation projects are designed to
focus on adaptation investment at the community level. We apply the
fuzzy-set QCA methodology to analyze the contextual conditions for a
stronger or weaker community focus in AF projects. We find that the
absence of high exposure to projected future climate risks is a necessary
condition for a weaker community focus in AF projects. We also find
that AF projects with a stronger community focus are stimulated by the
sole presence of higher exposure to projected future climate risks in a
set of countries, and by the complementary roles of civil society and the
access modality to the AF in others.
Our findings carry policy implications for global climate finance
actors seeking to promote locally inclusive use of international adap-
tation finance. First, the findings suggest that there are divergent policy
pathways to stimulate internationally-financed, community-focused
projects in developing countries. While earlier literature highlights the
promise of the direct access modality in promoting community-focused
adaptation (Fenton et al., 2014), this study shows that access modality
by itself does not automatically deliver the community-focused out-
come in all country contexts, and works in conjunction with the country
context to deliver the outcome only in some countries. The study also
shows that community-focused adaptation could be promoted under
both direct access and indirect access modalities.
Second, the study shows that country-level enabling conditions
matter for shaping the use of international adaptation finance at the
project level to be community-focused. While the analysis in this study
focuses on the project design, the country-level and project-level (access
modality) conditions that explain the variation in project design could
continue to influence project implementation. For example, in countries
where civil society and access modality have complemented each other
in driving the community-focused design of AF projects, such colla-
boration could continue to be important in ensuring that the strong
community focus is not diluted throughout the project cycle. However,
understanding this collaboration in the context of project im-
plementation, and which policy actions are needed to support it, will
require further research.
Finally, when the limited capacity of civil society plays a role in
shaping a weak community focus in internationally-financed adaptation
projects, particular policy attention should be given to strengthening a
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conducive environment for civil society to promote bottom-up adap-
tation approaches. This could include involving civil society actors such
as CBOs in local climate awareness campaigns and building their ca-
pacity in community engagement and climate finance readiness.
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Appendix A. Data, Measurements and Calibrations
Table A1/ and Table A2.
Table A1
Summary of raw and fsQCA scores for the 30 cases.
Cases Raw scores fsQCA scores
climpast climfuture govstructure govcivil modality community climpastfz climfuturefz govstructurefz govcivilfz modalityfz communityfz
Lebanon 121 0.332 0.198 0.48 0 3 0.01 0 0.99 0.52 0 0.05
Argentina 93 0.47 1.225 0.63 1 3 0.07 0.24 1 0.93 1 0.05
Peru 64 0.457 1.444 0.59 1 3 0.31 0.13 1 0.88 1 0.05
Cambodia 28 0.394 0.026 0.34 0 4 0.84 0 0.08 0.07 0 0.14
Jamaica 51 0.448 0.008 0.65 1 4 0.49 0.08 0.04 0.95 1 0.14
Uzbekistan 132 0.319 2.169 0.19 0 4 0.01 0 1 0 0 0.14
Honduras 1 0.445 0.355 0.45 0 4 0.98 0.07 1 0.38 0 0.14
Colombia 47 0.501 4.853 0.45 0 5 0.56 0.61 1 0.38 0 0.35
Egypt 136 0.36 0.042 0.34 0 5 0.01 0 0.14 0.07 0 0.35
Mauritania 74 0.364 0.007 0.45 0 5 0.2 0 0.04 0.38 0 0.35
Sri Lanka 70 0.499 0.171 0.38 0 6 0.24 0.59 0.96 0.14 0 0.65
Guatemala 10 0.479 0.206 0.58 0 6 0.95 0.35 0.99 0.86 0 0.65
Mali 122 0.525 0.015 0.58 0 6 0.01 0.8 0.05 0.86 0 0.65
Morocco 84 0.338 0.152 0.37 1 6 0.12 0 0.92 0.12 1 0.65
Chile 108 0.384 1.895 0.83 1 6 0.03 0 1 1 1 0.65
Uganda 95 0.52 1.461 0.39 0 6 0.07 0.77 1 0.16 0 0.65
Ethiopia 65 0.511 2.095 0.25 1 6 0.3 0.7 1 0.01 1 0.65
Panama 95 0.446 0.024 0.63 1 6 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.93 1 0.65
Paraguay 46 0.423 0.707 0.57 0 6 0.58 0.02 1 0.84 0 0.65
Belize 21 0.472 0.238 0.78 0 7 0.9 0.27 1 0.99 0 0.86
South Africa 74 0.431 1.556 0.64 1 7 0.2 0.03 1 0.94 1 0.86
Jordan 134 0.289 0.039 0.37 1 7 0.01 0 0.13 0.12 1 0.86
India 16 0.572 0.776 0.54 1 7 0.93 0.96 1 0.75 1 0.86
Niger 80 0.633 0.018 0.44 0 7 0.15 1 0.06 0.34 0 0.86
Rwanda 117 0.509 0.026 0.41 1 8 0.02 0.68 0.08 0.22 1 0.95
Kenya 70 0.508 0.105 0.42 1 8 0.24 0.67 0.65 0.26 1 0.95
Nepal 17 0.477 0.047 0.39 0 8 0.92 0.32 0.17 0.16 0 0.95
Lao 87 0.394 0.34 0.34 0 8 0.1 0 1 0.07 0 0.95
Costa Rica 60 0.451 0.148 0.81 1 9 0.36 0.1 0.91 1 1 0.99
Ghana 131 0.444 0.173 0.61 0 9 0.01 0.07 0.96 0.91 0 0.99
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Appendix B. Complex, parsimonious and intermediate solutions
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Appendix C. Truth Tables
Colombia is the case that shows simultaneous subset relations: the solution term associated with Colombia is identified as sufficient both for the
presence of the outcome (Table C1) and its absence (Table C2). To resolve this paradox, we follow the following the procedure detailed in
(Schneider and Wagemann, 2012, p.243–244). We multiply the raw consistency score with the Proportional Reduction in Inconsistency (PRI) score
to get the PRODUCT of the solution term associated with Colombia. For the presence of outcome (stronger community focus), the PRODUCT of the
solution term associated with Colombia is 0.3 (0.85*0.36). For the absence of outcome (weaker community focus), the PRODUCT of the solution
term associated with Colombia is 0.58 (0.91 *0.64).
According to Schneider & Wagemann (2012), only the one with a high PRODUCT value can be interpreted as sufficient for the outcome of
interest. Based on the two PRODUCT numbers for Colombia, we therefore consider the solution term sufficient for the absence of the outcome, and
not its presence.
Table C1
Truth table for the presence of outcome (Stronger community focus).




0 0 1 0 0 1 1 Niger 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 Rwanda 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 Jordan 0.994186 0.992188 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 India 0.931507 0.89899 0.89899
0 1 1 0 1 2 1 Kenya, Ethiopia 0.923497 0.869159 0.911765
1 1 0 1 0 3 1 Guatemala, Belize, Paraguay 0.918429 0.822368 0.822368
0 1 1 0 0 2 1 Sri Lanka, Uganda 0.902778 0.75 0.875
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 Mali 0.885496 0.788732 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 Morocco 0.849057 0.655914 0.871429
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 Colombia 0.845588 0.363636 0.363636
1 1 0 0 0 2 1 Lebanon, Ghana 0.837662 0.671053 0.671053
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 Honduras 0.748792 0.246377 0.246377
1 0 0 0 1 2 0 Jamaica, Panama 0.709091 0.542857 0.672566
0 1 0 0 0 2 0 Uzbekistan, Lao 0.679612 0.435898 0.461538
1 1 0 0 1 5 0 Argentina, Costa Rica, South
Africa, Chile, Peru
0.637744 0.522857 0.575472
0 0 0 1 0 2 0 Cambodia, Nepal 0.61326 0.473684 0.473684
0 0 0 0 0 2 0 Egypt, Mauritania 0.591837 0.0697677 0.092308
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